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from complying with the subpoena and against the Senators on the
Sub-Committee and the Sub-Committee counsel restraining them
from seeking to enforce ·the subpoenas by contempt of Congress or
any other means.

The USDC denied the TRO on the grounds of lack

of standing and a failure of subject matter jurisdiction.
CA reversed with MacKinnon dissenting.
USDC

The

After a hearing, the

(Gasch) denied a preliminary injunction but the CA over

dissent stayed enforcement of the subpoena.

At the hearing on

----

the merits, the USDC denied a permanent injunction, dismissed
the Senators as parties defendant, and denied an order compelling
the testimony of the Sub-Committee's chief counsel as to certain
--------~------------~--------------------------(The Senate inS. Res. 478, 9lst Cong.,
ex~a-~e~d m~tt~rs.
2d Sess. had prohibited the counsel from testifying about any
matters not of public record.)
On appeal of this decision, theCA consolidated the USSF
case

w~th

three related cases involving subpoenas of the House

Committe e on Internal Security relating to bank records of the

.

C)

Progressive Labor Party (PLP), National Peace Coalitjon (NPC),
and t

~

People's Coalition for Peace and Justice

(PCPJ).

-----------------------------------------------

Discussing only the facts in the USSF case, Judges Tuttle and
Bazelon reversed the decision below over Judge MacKinnon's
dissent.

The majority held that in the instant case the

---------------------------------------

organizatjons could vindicate their rights only through direct

----------

injunctive relief, that the court had subject matter jurisdiction,

-3that the organizations had standing to contest the third party
subpoena because they alleged a violation of their First Amendm e nt
rights, that the case was not a political question, that the
Senators were not immune from an injunction against issuance and
~~

------------------------

service as opposed to authorization of a subpoena as this was not
within the Speech and Debate Clause nor a legislative act, that
the subpoena

illegal as causing irreparable damage to freedom

wa~

---------------------

of association (reversing the balancing test based on Barenblatt
~

applied in USDC), and that the USDC on remand should consider
taking testimony from the Sub-Committee counsel and that an actual
injunction should issue against the Senators only if declaratory
relief would not suffice.

The dissent would have held the

subpoenas proper under Barenblatt and Uphaus, that the case
presented a political question, and that the Senators were immune
as acting within the legislative sphere under Doe v. McMillan.
The CA denied en bane a motion for rehearing en bane with

-- -----

Judges Tamm, MacKinnon, and Wilkey dissenting and Judge Robb

.

'

not participating.

Petrs, Senators Eastland, McClellan, Ervjn,

-----

Bayh, Thurmond, and Cook and the Senate Sub-Committee Counsel,
-.. .

,.......__

seek cert renewing their arguments below.

There is as yet no

I

petition from the House Committee wjth regard to its subpoenas.
~

Resps argue that the Senate subpoena is 4 years

old and that the questions presented in the immediate case are
theoretical rather than real since there is no on-going Senate

?
I

-4investigation.

Although the petition does not directly respond

to this argument, it appears frivolous inasmuch as the Senate
resolution authorizing the investigation remains in effect and
the on-going U tigation in the immediate case is evidence of the
Sub-Committee's intent to investigate USSF.
Facts :

USSF is a non-profit tax exempt organization whose

---:-

primary activities include the setting up of coffee houses and
I.

q

.
'I
d t h e war ld f or m1. 1 1tary
.
.
aroun
personne 1 an d t h e supp 1 1ng
1 1. b rar1es
o f l egal counsel to military personnel in order to aid them in
escaping their "repressive environment " --....
anri to promote the peace
movement generally through activities with
Senate Resolution 341 (9lst Cong.,

u.s.

military personnel.

2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec.

34 17 -3418) authorized the Sub-CoiTmittee to make a continuing
i nvestigation of the administration of the Internal Security Act
o f 1 950 and subversive activities in the U.S. under the control
o f foreign governments or organizations.

Pursuant to this power,

the Sub-Committee in 1970 adopted a resolution stating that USSF
should be the subject of further investigation based on the
evidence gathered concerning it and the subpoena was issued under
t his resolution.

The apparent purpose of the subpoena was to

l earn whether USSF was receiving foreign funding.
Contentions:

(1) The petrs argue that anticipatory reljef

o f the type granted in the instant case violates the prjnciple
o f separation of powers lcf. Hutche·son v . United States, 369 U.S.

-5599, 622] and will cripple the use of congressional process through

---------

allowing a judicial challenge without risk of contempt.

They argue

that the CA justification of this as the only possible remedy where
the records are in the hands of a third party is not rational ]n
light of Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 and Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 holding that there is only a permissive
and not a manditory right to intervene in the case of third party
subpoenas.

They argue that the instant decision const]tutes a

gross abuse of judicial power based on an ill defined

consti-

tutional allegation and constitutes the first jnstance of
in j unctive relief against Congress itself.
Resps argue that the instant case like United States v.
Nixon is one of the small class of cases fitting within the
exception in Perlman v. United States,

247 U.S. 7 (1918) allowing

review of a subpoena prior to contempt because review afterwards
wo uld be impossible.

The CA majority while recognizing

that

such an anticipatory remedy was extraordinary and unprecedented
held it justified in the immediate case by the total absence
o f any alternate means to vindicate resps'

?
(7

rights.

( 2 ) Petrs argue that they are immune from suit to enjoin
t hem from the issuance or enforcement of the]r subpoena by
reason of the Speech and Debate Clause which immunizes them in the
p erformance of such legislative action.

The issuance and serv1ng

o f the subpoena are " things generally done in a session of the

-6-

House by one of its members in relation to the business before .i t"
[Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 quoted in Doe v. McMillan,
412

u.s.

306, 311] and unlike the arrest in Kilbourn are not beyond

the apparent needs of the due functioning of the legislative process.
Doe, supra at 311.

Unlike other cases allowing suits against

legislators, relief here can not be afforded "without proof of a
legislative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an act.. "
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621.

The result of the CA

action is that whenever a congressional subpoena is issued,
Congressmen will have to come into court to defend their action.
Cf. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387

u.s.

82.

The resps rely on language from Gravel, supra at 621 to show
the absence of

i~munity

and reason generally that immunity from suit

is not really involved in the instant case -- merely the timing of
review of congressional subpoenas with anticipatory relief justified
here by the impossibility of post-contempt review and the evasion
of a judicial test through the third party subpoena.

The

c

analogizing the instant case to Doe, supra concluded that while
the authorization of an unconstitutional subpoena is within the
legislative sphere and hence immune, the service of such a
subpoena is not.
(3) Finally, the petrs argue that the subpoena was not violative
of First Amendment rights.

They point out that the CA djd not find

an illicit motive behind their actions, that foreign funding of a

----

I

~x-exempt organization devoted to promulgating opposjtion to U.S.
/

foreign policy among military personnel abroad during a foreign
war is directly relevant to a number of legitimate legislative
objectives, that the records sought belong to the bank and not the

u.s.

USSF [cf. California Bankers Assn v. Schultz,
April 1, 1974); Donaldson, supra at 537

(Douglas,

J

(dec:i ded

concurring)],

and that such commercial finand al records sought for legitimate
legislative inquiry are not like the membership lists in Pmvell
or other cases sought for illicit purposes.

Both USDC judges
(

-

and the CA dissenter, balancing under Barenblatt v. United States,
..

~ ;;::>

360 U.S. 109 (1959), found that the need for the information
outweighed any effect on free association.
TheCA majority held that the subpoena would act to chill First
Amendment rights of free association in a controversial political
organization (relying on the NAACP v. Alabama cases) particularly
through deterring potential donors.
was unconstitutional.

It concluded that the subpoena

Resps generally repeat the reasoning of the

CA relying particularly on Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1962).
(4)

It is uncertain from petrs'
1

rather unclear petitjon

.

whether they intend to renew here other arguments made below such
as lack of standing in resps to challenge a third party subpoena
and characterization of the case as a political question.
they do, they have not lucidly stated them in their brief.

If

-8-

Resps below raised a question as to whether the subpoena was
defective because of a lack of specificity and failure of nexus
with the original resolution on which the CA expressly reserved
judgement.
Discussion:

The case is obviously certworthy.

Unless

Barenblatt is negated by Gibson, the decision below was error to
the extent that it failed to consider the substantjal governmental
interests asserted by petrs but merely found an encroachment of
freedom of association and concluded that the subpoena was there-

, \fore unconstituttonal.
. a::

t~ s~me

If Gibson does govern, and the bank records

as NAACP membership lists, it may be argued that the

error if any was harmless since the government could not possibly
meet Gjbson's requireme nt of a "compelling jnterest".
The extremely narrow reading of congressional immunity under
the Speech and Debate Clause achieved by distinguishing between
•
authorization of subpoenas (within the legislative sphere) and
servtng subpoenas

(outside the legislative sphere)

is an artificial

and dubious one.
Finally, the case answers the question expressly left open
in Powell v. McCormack and holds that coercive injunctive relief
may be applied against members of Congress although only after
they have failed to heed declaratory relief.
The decision below is an extraordinary one with unanswered
legal issues of significance meriting review by this Court.
There is a response.
8/20/7tl
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

Ron Carr
No. 73-1923

Eastland, et al. v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, et al.

I reconnnend that you vote to reverse, on either of
two grounds: ~irsti) that there was no proper party defendant, and
econd

if that ground is rejected, that the subpoena's incidental
~ ~K.be rs
t he i ,consequences on respondent's j exercise of 4-E-B- First Amendment
associational rights are outweighed by the Connnittee's need for
the information in performing its legitimate legislative functions.
1.

The problem arises because of the peculiar problems

posed by third-party subpoenas, particularly when directed to
banks.
Respondent itself possesses copies of the information
......._____
subpoenaed here. If the Connnittee had subpoenaed respondent,
respondent could have refused to comply.

The Connnittee could

then have voted a contempt revolution, which, if approved by
the Senate, would have been referred to the Justice Department
for prosecution.

If Justice decided to prosecute, respondent

could have defended on the ground that the subpoena violated the
First Amendment.
But the subpoena was directed to the bank.
apparently) no recognized bank-depositor privilege.

There is,
Hence, the

bank has no incentive to refuse to comply and thus risk a contempt

2.

prosecution.

Respondent, therefore, has no recourse but to

attempt to prevent the bank's compliance; otherwise the alleged
violation of its associational rights cannot be vindicated.
Petitioners raise here only obliquely two arguments
vigorously pressed below - that the district court was without
jur isdiction, and that the case is non-justiciable.

I think

it clear that there was subject-matter jurisdiction under
1331.

Nor is the case non-justiciable.

Justiciability depends

on the nature of the question on the merits.

First, even

assuming that respondent would not have standing to raise a
Fourth Amendment claim, having no possessory interest in the
bank's records, it does have standing to assert its associational
rights.

Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, aff'd without opinion,

393 U.S. 14 (1968).

Second, the First Amendment issue is in no

sense a political question; exactly that sort of question may
be, and has been, resolved by courts in congressional contempt
suits.
2.

This Court has often stated that the Speech and

Debate Clause protects not only against legal liability

(e.~.,

in damages) but also against even having to defend against
suits contesting actions taken within the ambit of the Clause's

-----------------------

protection.

From this it follows that application of the

Clause cannot depend on whether the action was or was not
constitutional.

See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367.

From this it follows that whether the subpoena here violates
respondent's First Amendment rights is irrelevant to the

.

quest~on

r1
)\

3.

whether the Senators or the Connnittee Counsel are innnune from
suit.
In this Court' Speech and Debate irrrrn:unity cases Kilbourn, Powell, Gravel, and Doe v. McMillan - the distinction
is drawn between legislative functions, which are innnune, and
non-legislative functions, which are not.

Thus, in Kilbourn,

the legislators who voted the arrest were innnune; the sergeantat-arms making the arrest was not.

In Powell, the legislators

who voted the exclusion were irrrrn:une; the doorkeeper and
sergeant-at-arms, who refused to pay Powell and physically
barred him from the House, were not.

In Gravel, the Court made

clear that the distinction was not between the legislators
themselves and their employees.

On the contrary, if an

aide did something that, if done by the legislator himself,
would have been "legislative" and hence innnune, the irrrrn:unity
also attackCSto the aide.

This analysis was followed in

MacMillan.
The majority opinion below purports to follow this
analysis.
and innnune;
at 68.

e-------

It holds that authorizing the subpoena is legislative
issuing and serving the subpoena is not.

App.

Under Kilbourn and the other cases, this distinction

makes some sense.

The court remanded the case on this point,

on the ground that the record was insufficient to determine
whether and as to which of the defendants irrrrn:unity would attach.
App. at 89-80.

4.
The problem with this analysis, however, (assuming
it is otherwise valid) is that when this suit was brought,
the subpoena had

~~ injunction was

already~e.:-issued

and served.

~

Hence an

V>

sought, not against issuance and service,

but against enforcement of the subpoena.

But

I should think, is clearly a legislative act.

enforceme~
It is

~/
~~--~<A-"'-._

1
In short, the question here is not whether the 0L~~~

accomplished by resolution of the Cormnittee and then of the _
Senate.

~

marshal or other functionary can be enjoined from serving

cl!_, ~

~

the subpoena, but whether, once the subpoena is served, the
Committee and its counsel can be enjoined from enforcement.
I would hold that they cannot, enforcement being a legislative
act.
If this is so, respondent would appear to be without
remedy.

They ask for an injunction against enforcement by

the Cormnittee and its counsel and against compliance by the
bank.

The suit against the bank is derivative from that

against the Committee; only the Government can violate First
Amendment associational rights.

I think that a creative lawyer

might be able to devise an independent cause of action against
a bank.

For example, one c ould conceive of a state action

against the bank on privacy grounds for complying with an
allegedly invalid subpoena; the bank could defend on the
ground of the subpoena's validity, and remove to the federal court,

5.

whereupon the Conrrnittee could intervene.

Or perhaps a

federal right of action could be implied (with difficulty)
from the Bank Privacy Act.

But the claim against the bank

here was entirely dependent on the claim against the Conrrnittee.
3.

If you decide that the Conrrnittee members and

counsel are not inrrnune

=

either because issuance and service are

non-legislative and are still in the case, or because
enforcement is non-legislative, I reconrrnend that you vote to
hold that the subpoena here did not violate
associational rights.

respond~nt's

Most of the association cases

respondent and the court below cite are distinguishable on
the ground that, in those cases, there was no clear connection
between the material sought and a legitimate, articulated
state need.
the case.

Here, I think it obvious that the contrary is
The financial records were clearly and directly

relevant to the Committee's legitimate investigative and
legislative purposes.
700 (1972).

~

~

See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,

There is language in Gibson v. Legislative

Investigative Conrrn., 372 U.S. 539, arguably to the effect that
the state's interest must be compelling.

If this is the

standard, then I would hold it satisfied here.
think it is the correct standard.

There is here no direct

attempt to infringe on associational rights.

---------

But I don't

Instead, the

infringement, if any, is incidental to the Conrrnittee's
-=:::::::::::attempt to perform functions clearl within the scope of its

6.

legislative duties.

In such cases, a majority of this

Court has consistently held that the First Amendment question
must be decided by balancing the consequences on associational
interests against the reasons and need for the Government
action.

I would hold that the subpoena here passes this test.
I have expressed my views in this case at greater

length than you directed for two reasons.

First, the

case is novel and of substantial importance.
somewhat disturbed b
no remedy.

my own

conclus ~on

Second, I am

that respondent has

Of course, that remedy would not do respondent

much good if, as I think, there is no .First Amendment
violation.

But I find it quite di sturbing that a person

whose bank records are subpoenaed has no way of having
the First Amendment question adjudicated.

There is, I

think, some legitimate expectation of privacy with respect

______

to ones
dealings with a bank, as you stated in California
....---____
Bankers, 416

u.s.

at 78-79.

But I see no way of protecting

that interest in a suit against a congressional committee
and counsel to bar enforcement that is consistent with this
Court's previous Speech and Debate cases.

~
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No. 73-1923

James 0. Eastland et al.,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
Unite d States Court of
v.
Appeals for the District
United States Servicemen's
of Columbia Circuit,
Fund et al.

- ~

[April -, 1975]
MR. CHIEF J usTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal
court may_enjoin the~nce or implementation by
Congress of a subpoena duces te,cum that directs a bank
to produce -t:ri;b'an'k- records of' an organization which
claims a First Amendment privilege status for those
records on the ground that they are the equivalent of
confidential membership lists. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that compliance with the subpoena "would invade the constitutional
rights" of the organization, and tha.t judicial relief is
available to prevent implementation of the subpoena.

/l..sL~ I::>_
A _ /) _ . __
~··

J
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Circulated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

~d--~1r-1
~
p-.J{/- -

h;:1]

,

~
~ ~tDRAFT

~ ~

~

Mr. Jtwt:.c~ c~
Mr • cJu.,.·t·J·
C"'
..
'
o
·v ',
Mr. Just:Lcu :. 'j···
1
Mr. Justice Blac · !'1u..1
J._

~

...,;--

.. ___ Mr . Just:i.ce Doucr' ·" C-.(
Mr · <Tuotico Ih ,_, ;~ ~ /,,-f''{"

I

ln early 1970 the Senate Subcommittee on Internal
Security was given broad authority by the Senate to
"make a complete and continuing study and investiga~
tioll of .. . the administrat1011, operation and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950...." S. Res.
341, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 3419 (January 30, 1970). The authority encompassed discovering

~~XiEnl:::A;"d~~tei~

I

1
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the United States," and the resolution specifically
directed inquiry concerning "infiltration by persons who
are or may be under the control of foreign governments. . . :" Ibid. See also S. Res. 366, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. Pursuant to that mandate the Subcommittee
be ·an an in uir into the activities of res ondent herem,
SSF).
the United Statz: erv1ce.:.,ne!Ls und, .Inc.
DSSF describes Ttself as a nonprofit membership corporation supported by contributions. 1 Its stated purpose is "to further the welfare of persons who have
served or are presently serving in the military." To
accomplish its declared purpose USSF has engaged in
various activities 2 directed at United States servicemen.
It established "coffeehouses" near domestic military installations, and aided thelJublication of "underground"
newspapers for distribution on American military installations throughout the world. The coffeehouses were
meeting places for servicemen, and ti1e newspapers were
specialized publications which USSF daims dealt with
issues of concern to servicemen. Through these opera- J
tions USSF attempted to communicate to servicemen
its philosophy and attitudes concerning United States
involvement in South East Asia. USSF claims the
coffeehouses and newspapers "became the focus of dissent and expressions of opposition within thP military
toward the war in Southeast Asia." 3
In the course of its investigation of USSF, the Subcommittee concluded that a prima facie showing had
been made of the need for further investigation, and it
resolved that appropriate subpoenas, including subpoen as
USSF is, or ha<~ been, listed with the Internal Revenue Service
a tax exempt charitable organization.
2 According to the complaint fih>d in th1s action USSF has helped
provide c1vilian legal defense for military personnel, and books,
newspapers and library material on request. App., at 11.
2 App., at ll.
1

a~

13-19'23-0PINION
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(luces tec·um could be issued. Petitioner Eastland, a
United States Senator, is, as he was then, Chairma,n of
the Subcommittee. On Ma~970 , pursuant to the
-;:-------'
above authority, he signed a subpoena dUcces tecum,
issued on behalf of the SUbcommittee, to the bank where
USSF has an account. The subpoena comm~ed the
--bank to produce on June 4, 1970,
uany and all records appertaining to or involving
the account or accounts of [USSF]. Such records
to comprehend papers, correspondence. statements.
checks, deposit slips and supporting documentation,
or microfilm thereof within [the bank's] control or
custody or within [its] means to produce/'

From the record it appears the subpoena was never
actually served on the bank. 4 In any event, before the
June 4, 1970, return d'a.t e, USSF and· two of i'ts members·
b~Iit this a.ctl.on to eiljoin implen:)entation of the sufJpoena duces tecum.
Tfie, complaint named' as defendants Chairman Eastland·, eight other Senators, the Chief Counsel to the
Subcommittee, ancf the bank. 5 The complaint charged
that the· authorizing resolutions and the Subcommittee's
actions implementing them were an unconstitutional
subpoena at is,;ue here directed "Any U. S. MarHhal" io
serve and return, but there is no proofofservice ·in the record. The·
·Subcommittee had . issued two previons subpoenas duces tec'l,lm to
the bank, but they had been withdrawn because of procedural' prob•
!em:-;. Apparently, at least one of thm;e subpormas actually was
. served on the bank. App ., at 13. The other subpoena also may
have bee11 served bec..<tuse the bank informed respondents of its exist('UCe. App., at 14. Respondf'nts claim all three subpoenas are ~:;ub~ ..
stantiall.v identical.
5 Apparently, at least partially becmtde the bank wat; rwver ::;ervedl
Tr. of Oral Arg. 22; 46, it has not particijlated ~ in the ·action. Tr..
of Oral Arg. 15, Hl-~20, 22.:.23. Tht>refore, as the case reaches us ·
. onJ;y the: Sepators a.nd the. Chief Counsell are.· active . p.articip.antls~'·
4 ·Tht>

I
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abuse of the legislative power of inquiry, that the ''sole
purpose" of the Subcommittee investigation was to force
"public disclosure of beliefs, opinions, expressions au<l
associations of private citizens which may be unorthodox
or uupopular." and that the "sole purpose:'" of the subpoena was to "harass, chill, punish and deter [USSF
and its membersl in their exercise of their rights and
duties under the First Amendment and particularly to
stifle the freedorn of the press and association guaranteed by that Ameudmellt.n The subpoena was issued to
the bank rather than to USSF and its members, the
complaint claimed, "in order to deprive [them] of their
right to protect their private records, such as the sources
of their contributions, as they would be entitled to do
if the subpoena had been issued against them directly."
The complaint further claimed that financial support to
USSF is obtained exclusively through contributions from
private individuals, and if the bank records are disclosed "much of that financial support will be withdrawn, and USSF will be unable to continue its constitutionally protected activities. 7
For relief USSF and its members, the respondents,
sought a permanent injunction restraining the members of the Subcommittee and its Chief Counsel from
trying to enforce the subpoena by contempt of Congress
or other means and restraming the bank from complying with the subpoena.s Respondents also sought a
declaratory judgment declaring the subpoena and the
Senate resolutions void under the Constitution. No
damage claim was made.
Since the return date on the subpoena was June 4,
1970, three days after the action was begun, enforcement
App ., at 16.
1\pp., at 17-18.
8 App., at 1&

6

7

of the .s.ub~1a .!£S~f;&illl 9 m order to avoid mootness
and to pr~vent possible ·irreparable injury. The District
Court then held hearings and took testimony on the
matter. That court ultimately held 10 that respondents
had not made a sufficient showing of irreparable injury
to warrant an injunction. The court also purported to
strike a balance between the legislative interest and respondents' asserted First Amendment rights, NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). It concluded that a
valid legislative purpose existed for the inquiry because
Congress was pursuing its functions, under Art. I, § 8,
of raising and supporting an army, and had a legitimate
in ter·est in "scru tiniz [ ing] closely possible infiltration
of subversive elements into an organization which directly affects the armed forces of this country." 11 Rely9 On J nne 1, 1he District Court refused to enter a temporary restraining order, but on .June 4 the Court of \ppeals stayed enforcement of the subpoena pending expedited considPration of the matter
by the District Court. Thl Court of Appeals reasoned that thethreat of irreparabl€' injury 1f the subpoena was honored, and the
significance of the is~>U€'s involved, necessitated "the kind of considemticn and deliberatiOn that would be provided by . . a hearing on
an application for an injunction." App., at 22. One judgedissented.
10 After the Court of Appeals stayed enforcement of the ~ubpuena
the D1strict Comt lwld au expedited hearing on respondPnt~' motion
for a preliminary mjnnction a:td petitioners' motion to dismi~tS
AftPrward:,; the Distriet Court demed both motions; howrver, the
Court of Appeals agam stayed enforcement of the subporna 1Jendin~~:
further order. At that timP the Court of Appeals ordered theDJ::;trict Court to proceed to final judgment on the merits, with a
view to consolidatmg any appeal from that JUdgment with the ap
peal on rhr denial of a preliminary mjunction. The D1strict Court
thPll took trr;timony 011 the mPrit~ and, finally, denied respondt•ntsr
motion for a permanent injunction of the subpoena. Appeal from
that demsion apparpntly wu~ consolidated w1th the· awpeal from thcr
afenial of the prl'liminary injunC'tion.
Jl App, at 31.
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ing on Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ,
the District Court concluded that the legislative interest
must prevail over respvndents' asserted rights; it denied
respondents' motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions. It also dismissed as to the defendant Senators after conclud-ing that the Speech or Debate Clause
immunizes them from suit. Dombrowski v. Eastland,
387 U. S. 82 (1967).
The Cour:_ of ~Is _reversesJ.. holding first that,
althougii'COurts should hesitate to interfere with congressional actions even where First Amendment rights
clearly are implicated, such restraint could not preclude
judicial review where no alternative avenue of relief is
available other than "through the equitable powers of
the court." 488 F. 2d, at 1259. Here the subpoena was
directed to a third party who could not be expected to
refuse compliance; unless respondents could obtain judicial relief the bank might comply, the case would become
moot, and the asserted violation of respondents' constitutioual rights would be irreparable. Because the subpoeua was not directed to respondents, the Court of
Appeals noted, the traditional route for raising their
defenses by refusing compliance and testing the legal
issues in a contempt proceeding was not available to
them. Ansara v. Eastland, - - U. S. App . D. C' - ,
442 F . 2d 751 (1971) .
Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that if the
subpoena was obeyed respondents' First Amendment
rights would be violated. The court said:
"'The right of voluutary associations, especially
those engaged in activities which may not meet with
popular favor, to be free from having either state or
federfll officials expose their affiliation and membership absent a compelling state or federal purpose has
been made clear a nmnber of times. See NAACP v.

I
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Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; Bates v. Little Roclc, 361
U. S. 516; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v, NAACP,
366 U. S. 293 ( 1962); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Committee, 372 U. S. 539 ( 1962); Pollard v. Roberts,
393 U. S. 14 ( 1968). affirming the judgment of the
three-judge district court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, 283 F. Supp. 248 ( 1968) ." 488 F. 2d, at
1264.

In this case that right would be violated, the Court of
Appeals held. because discovery of the identities of
donors was the admitted goal of the subpoena, 488 F. 2d,
at 1267, and that infonnation could be gained as easily
from bank records as from membership lists. Moreover,
. if donors' identities we~·e revealed, or if donors reasonably
feared that result, USSF's contributions would decrease
substantially, as had already occurred merely because of
the threat posed by the subpoena.12
The Court of Appeals then fashioned a remedy to
deal with the supposed violation of rights. It ordered
the District Court to "consider the extent to which committee counsel should properly be requir~d to give evidence as to matters without the legislative sphere." 488
F. 2d, at 127'0. 1 " It also ordered that the court should
u It appears that the District Court finding of failure to show
irreparable injury was held clearly erroneous. 488 F. 2d, at 1267.
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52 (a).
1
a Hespondents had made a motion in the District Court to compel petitioner Sourwine, thE' subcommittee counsE'l, lo give testunony.
The Senate passed a resolution, S. Res. 478, October 14, 1970,
authorizing Sourwine to testify only fi.R to matter~ of public record
Respondents moved to compd further testimony from Sourwine, but
the District Court denied the motion. The court ruled Sm1rwme's
information "ha~> been received by him pursuant to his official duties
as a staff employee of the Senate .. [a]s such thr information is
within the privilege of the Senate ... Senate Rule 301, Senate Manual, Senate Document No. 1 of the DOth Congress, F£rst Session."
App., at, 38. The court abo ruled. that the Senate marle a t1mely
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"be liberal in granting the right of amendment" to re·
spondents to add other parties if thereby "the case can
better proceed to a decisiou on the validity of the subpoena." Ibid. Members of Congress could be added as
parties, the Court of Appeals said, if their presence is
"unavoidable if a valid order is to be entered by the
court to vindicate rights which would otherwise go unredressed." Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded that
declaratory relief against Members is "preferable" to
"any coercive order." Ibid. The clear implication is
that the District Court was authorized to enter a "coercive order" which in context could mean that the Sub .
committee could be prevented from pursuing its inquiry
by use of a subpoena to the bank.
One judge dissented on the ground that the membership list cases were distinguishable because in none of
them was there a "showing that the lists were requested
for a proper purpose." 1188 F. 2d, l'tt 1277. Here, on
the other hand, the dissenting judge concluded, "there
is a demonstrable relationship between the information
sought and the valid legislative interest of the federal
Congress" in discovering whether any money for USSF
activities 11 came from foreign sources or subversive organizations," 488 F. 2d. at 1277--1278, whether 1JSSF activities may have constituted violations of 18 U. S. C.
§ 2387 (a) which prohibits interference with the loyalty,
discipline or morale of the armed services, or whether the
anonymity of USSF donors might have disguised persons
who had not complied with the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U. S. C. § 611 et .seq. Finally. he noted that
the prime purpose of the Subcommittee's inquiry was to
and appropriate invocation of its privilege. Thus information held
by Sourwine was not discoverable. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b) ( 1).
Respondents' appeal from this ruling was heard by the Court of Appeals with their appeals from the denial of injunctive relief. 488 F.
2d, at 1258.
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investigate application of the Internal Security Act, 50
U. S. C. § 781 et seq., and that too provided a legitimate
congressional interest.
The dissenting judge then balanced the congressional
interests against private rights, Barenblatt v. United
States, supra; Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178,
198, and struck the balance in favor of the investigative
role of Congress. He reasoned that there is no right to
secrecy which can frustrate a legitimate congressional
inquiry into an area where legislation may be had. 488
F. 2d, at 1278-1279, 1282. Absent a showing that the
information sought could not be used in the legislative sphe~e, he concluded, judicial il1terference was
unwarranted.
We conclude the actions of the Senate Subcommittee,
the individual Senators, and the Chief Counsel are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution , Art. I , § 6, GL 1, and are therewre immune from
judicial interfe~ence. We reverse.

II
The question 14 to be resolved 1s whether the actions
of the petitioners fall within the "sphere of legislative activity." If they do, the petitioners "shall not be
questioned in any other place" about those activities
since the prohibitions of the Speech or Debate Clause
are absolute, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 312-313;
14 The Court of Appeals correctly held that the District Court
properly entertained this action initially. As the Court of Appeals
indicated, 488 F. 2d 1259--1260, there is a s.ignificant difference between a subpoena that seeks information directly from a party
and one that sreks the same information from a third person. In
the former ea,;e, of eourse, the party can re.:;ist and thereby tPst the
.,;ubpoena In the latter ca,;e, however, unless a court may inquire
to determine whether a legitimate legislative purpo8e is present the
third person may comply and render irnpossiblr all ;1t1dicial inquiry.
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United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516 (1972);
Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 623 n. 14 (1972);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 502-503 (1969);
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 84-85 (1967);
United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 184-185 (1966);
Barr v. Mateo, 360 U. S. 564, 569 (1959). Without exception, our cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause
broadly to effectuate its purpo~es. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881); United States v. Johnson,,
383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966); Powell v. McCormack, 395
U. S. 486, 502-503 (1969); United States v. Brewster, 408
U. S. 501, 508-509 (1972); Gravel v. United States, 408
U. S. 606, 617-618 (1972); cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U. S. 367, 376-378 (1951). The purpose of the Clause
is to insure that the legislative function the Constitution
allocates to Congress may be performed independently.
"The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause
were not written into the Con,>titution simply for
the personal or private benefit of Members of
Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators." United States v. Brewster, 408
U. S. 501, 507 (1971).

In our system "the clause serves the additional function
of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately
established by the Founders." United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S., at 178.
The Clause is a product of the English experience.
Kilb01.trn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881); United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177-179 (1966). Due
to that heritage our cases make it clear that the "central
role" of the Clause is to "prevent intimidatiOn of legislators by the Executive a.nd accountability before a
possible hostile judiciary, Unded States v. Johnson, ~~83
U. S. 159, 181 (1966)," Gravel v. United Btates, supmft
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at 617. That role is not the sole function of the Clause.
however, and English history does not totally define the
reach of the Clause. Rather, it "must be interpreted
in light of the American experience, and in the context
of the American constitutional scheme of government .... " United States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U. S.
508. Thus we have long held that when it applies the
Clause provides protection against civil as well as CI·iminal actions, and against actions brought by private indi~
viduals as well as those initiated by the Executive
Branch. Kilbourn v. ' Thompson, supra; Tenney v.
Brandhove, supra; Doe v. McMillan, supra; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967).
The applicability of the Clause to private civil actions
is supported by the absoluteness of the terms "shall not
be questioned," and the sweep of the terms "in any other
place." In reading the Clause broadly we have said that
legislators acting within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity "should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden
of defending themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland,
supra, 387 U. S., at 85. Just as a criminal prosecution
infringes upon the independeuce which the Clause is
designed to preserve, a private civil action, whether for
an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces
Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from
their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Private
civil actions also may be used to delay and disrupt
the legislative function. Moreover, whether a criminal
action is instituted by the Executive Branch, or a civil
action is brought by private parties, judw1al power is
still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative independence is imperiled. We reaffirm that once
it is determined that Members are acting within the
"legitimate legislative sphere" the Speech or Debate

I
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Clause is an absolute bar to interference.
Millan, supra, 402 U. S., at 314.

Doe v. Mc-

III
In determini1:g whether particular activities other
than literal speech or debate fall within the "legitimate
legislative sphere" we look to see whether the activities
are "done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." Kilbourn v.
Thompson, supra, 103 U. S., at 204. More specifically,
we must determine whether the activities are
"an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members partiCJpate in
committee and House proceedings with respect to
the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters
which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House." Gravel v. United States, 408
606, 625 (1972).

u. s.

See Doe v. McMillan, supra, 412 U. S., at 313.
The power to investigate &-nd to do so through compulsory process plainly falls within that definition. This
Court has often noted that the power to investigate is
inherent in the power to make law because " [a] legislative body cannot legislate ~visely or effectively m the
absence of information re~:opecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affer.t or change." McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 125 175 ( 1927). See Anderson
v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1811). United States v. Rumley, 345 U. S. 41, 46 (Hl52). 15 Issuance of subpoenas
1
~ Although the power to inve::;tigatc is nE'ccs::;arily broad it JS not
unlimited. It::; boundan<•s arE' ddhwd by its source. Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957). Thus, "the scope of tlw
power of inquiry is as penetr::~tmg and far-rc>acbing as the potcntwl
power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution." Ba1·rn-
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such as the one in question here has long been held to
be a legitimate use by Congress of its power to investi ..
gate. Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 U. S., at 188.
"[W] here the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information--which not infrequently
is true-recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is
not always a.ccurate or GOmplete; so some means
of compulsion are essential to obtain what is
needed." McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U. S.,
at 175.
It also has been held that the subpoena power may be
exercised by a committee acting, as here, on behalf of
one of the Houses. !d., 273 U. S., at 158. Cf. Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377-378 (1951). Without
such power the subcommittee may not be able to do the
task assigned to it by Congress. To conclude that the
power of inquiry is other than an integral part of the
legislative process would be a miserly reading of the
Speech or Debate Clause in derogation of the "integrity
of the legislative process." United States v. Brewster,
408 U. S. 501, 545-546 (1971); and United States v.
Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 172 (1966).
We have already held that the "aet of authorizing an
investigation pursuant to which . . . materials were
gathered" is an integral part of the legislative process.
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 313 (1973). The routine implementation of the subpoena power pursuant to
blatt v. Umted States, 360 U. S. 109, 111 (1959), Sinclair· v. United
States, 279 U.S. 263, 291-292 (1929). WP have made it clear, however, that Congress is not invested with a "general power to inquire
into private affair;:;." McGrain v. Daugherty, 27;3 U . S., at 17a.
The subject of any inquiry always must be one "on which legislat ion
':ould be had ." ld., at 177.
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an authorized investiga.t10n is similarly an indispensable
ingredient of lawmaking; without it our recognition that
the "act of authorizing" is protected would be meaning~
less. To hold that Members of Congress are protected
for authorizing an investigation, but not for implement~
ing that authorization through the subpoena power,
would be a contradiction denigrating the power granted
to Congress in Art. I and would "indirectly impair the
delibrations of Congress." Gravel, supra, 408 U. S., at
625.
The particular investigation at issue here is related to \
and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.
Watkins v. United States, supra, 354 P. S., at 187. On
this record the pleadings show that the actions of the
Members and the Chief Counsel fall within the "sphere
of legitimate legislative activity." The Subcommittee
was acting under an unambiguous resolution from the
Senate authorizing it to make a complete study of the
"administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950 .... " S. Res. 341, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec. 3419 (January 30, 1970). That
grant of authority is sufficient to show that the investigation upon which the Subcommittee had embarked
concerned a subject on which "legislation could be had."
McGrain v. Dauoherty, 273 U. S., at 177; see Communist
Party v Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S.
1 (1961).
The propriety of making USSF a subject of the investi~
gation and subpoena is a subject on which the scope of
our inquiry is narrow. Hutcheson v. United States, 369
U. S., at 618-619. See Sinclair v. United States, 270
U. S. '263, 294-295 (1929). "The courts should not go
bey<)lld the narrow confines of determining that a com~·
mittce's inquiry may fairly be deemed \vithm its prov~
ince." Tenney v. Brandhove, supra1 341 U. S., at 378

I
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(1950). Cf. Doe v. McMillan, supra, 412 U.S. 315 n. 10.
Even the most cursory look at the facts presented by the
pleadings reveals the legitimacy of the USSF subpoena.
Inquiry into the sources of funds used to carry on activities su~pected by a Subcommittee of Con~s to hav~iJ,
potentiaiTor underminin the morale of the armed forces
is wit in t e eg1 ·1mate ~-~lativ§. ~~re. "'~'1I1cteed, the
c'Ornplan"i't'"'Tie'feteliSi'i'S1hatUSSF operated on or near
military and naval bases, and that its facilities became
the "focus of dissent" to declared national policy.
Whether USSF activities violated any statute is not relevant; the inquiry was intended to inform Congress in an
area where legislation may be had. USSF asserted it
does not know the sources of its funds; in light of the
Senate authorization to the Subcommittee to investigate
"infiltration by persons who are or may be under the
control of foreign governments," supra, at 1, and in
view of the pleaded facts, it is clear that the subpoena
to discover USSF's bank records "may fairly be deemed
within [the Subcommittee's] province." Tenney v.
Brandhove, supra.
We conclude that th<> Speech or Debate Clause provides complete immunity for the Members for the issuance and implementation of this subpoena. We draw no
rtistinction between the Membe and the Chief CounseL
In rrave , supra, we made it clear that "the day-to-day
work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance that they must be treated as [the Members'] alter
egos.... " ld., at 616-617. See 408 U.S., at 621. Here
the Chief Counsel has been charged in the complaint only
with implementing thE' subpoena in the same fashio11 as
the Senators. Contrast Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U. S., at 84. Since tho Members are immune because·
implementation of the subpoena is "essential to legislat··
ing1' their a1de shares that immunity.. Gravel v. United'
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States, 408 U. S., at 621; Doe v. McMillan, supra, 412
U. S., at 317.

IV
Respondents rely on language m Gravel v. United
States, supra, 408 U.S., at 621.
"[N] o prior case has held that Members of Congress would be immune if they executed an invalid
resolution by themselves carrying out an illegal
arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a
hearing, themselves seized property or invaded the
privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides
should be immune from liability or questioning in
such circumstances."
From this respondents argue that the subpoena works
an invasion of their privacy, and thus cannot be immune
from judicial questioning. The conclusion is unwarranted. The quoted language from Gravel referred to
actions which were not "essential to legislating." 408
U. S., at 621. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S.
169 (1966) . For example, the arrest by the Sergeant-AtArms was held unprotected in Kilbourn v. Thompson,
supra, because it was not "essential to legislating." See
Mar~:Jhall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 537 (1917). Quite
the contrary is the case with a routine subpoena intended
to gather information about a subject on which legisla·tion may be had. See Quinn v. Un'ited States, 349 U.S.
155, 161 (1955).
Respondents also contend that the subpoena eannot
be protected by the speech or debate immunity because
the "sole purpose" of the investigation is to "foree public
(hsclosure of beliefs, opinions, expressions and associations of private citizens which may be unorthodox or unpopular." App., at 16. Hespondents view the scope of
the privilege t oo narrowly. Our cases make clear that
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in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we
do not look to the motives alleged to have prompted it.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 200 (1957);
Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U. S. 599, 614 (1961).
In Brewster, supra, we said "the Speech or Debate Clause
protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process and into the motive
for those acts." Id., at 525 (emphasis added). And in
Tenney v. Brandhove we said that, "[t]he claim of an
unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege." 341
U. S., at 377. If the mere allegation that a valid legislative act was undertaken for an unworthy purpose would
lift the protection of the Clause then the Clause simply
would not provide the protection historically undergirding it. "In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed." Tenney v. Brandhove,
supra, 341 U. S., at 379. The wisdom of congressional
approach or methodology is not open to judicial veto.
Doe v. McMillan, supra, at 313. Nor is the legitimacy
of a congressional inquiry to be defined by what it pro-·
duces. The very nature of the investigative functionlike any research-is that it takes the searchers up some
"blind alleys" and into nonproductive enterprises. To
be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable
end result.
Finally, respondents argue that the purpose of the subpoena was to "harass, chill, punish and deter them" in
the exercise of their First Amendment rights, App., at 16,
and thus that the subpoena cannot be protected by the
Clause. Their theory seems to be that once it is alleged
that First Amendment rights may be infringed by congressional action the judiciary may intervene to protect
those rights; the Court of Appeals seems to have subscribed to that theory. That approach, however, ignores
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the absolute nature of the speech or debate protection 1'6
and our cases which have broadly construed that
protection.
"Congressmen and their aides are immune from
liability for their actions within the 'legislative
16 In some situations we have balanced First Amendment rights
against public interests, Watkins v. United States, 345 U. S . 178
(1957); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), but those
cases did not involve attempts by private parties to impede congressional action where the Sperch or Debate Clause was raised by
Congress by way of defense. Cf. United States v. Rttmely, 345
U. S. 41, 46 (1953). The cases were criminal prosecutions where
defendants sought to justify their refusals to answer congressional
inquiries by asserting their Firflt Amendment rights. Different problems were presented then here. Any interference with congressional action had already occurred when the cases reached us, and
Congress was seeking the aid of the judiciary to enforce its will.
Our task was to perform the judicial function in criminal prosecutions, and we properly scrutinized the predicates at the criminal
prosecutions. Watkins, supra, 354 U. S., at 208; Flaxer- v. United
States, 358 U. S. 147, 151 (1959); Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155, 162, 169 (1955); In re 1/utcheson, 369 U.S. 599, 630-631
(Warren, C. J., dissenting); 640 (DouGLAS, J., dissenting). As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said conemring in Watkin.~:
"By . . . making the federal judiciary the affirmative agency for,
enforcing the authority that underlies the congressional power to
pumsh for contempt, Ccngrr~s necessarily brings into play the specific provisions of the Constitution relating to the prosecution of
offenses and those implied restrictions under which courts function ."
Watkins v. Umted States, 854 U. S. 178, 216 (Frankfurter, .J.,
concurring).
Where we are presented with an attempt to interfere with an ongomg activity by Congress, and that act is found to be within the
legitimate legislative sphcn· , balancing play:J no part. The Speech
or Debate protection provides an absolute immunity from judicial
interference. Collateral harm which may occur in the course of a
legitimate legislative inquiry does not allow us to force th0 inquiry
to "grind to a halt." Hutcheson v. United States, 809 U . S. 599, 618
(1962) ,
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sphere,' Gravel v. Um'ted States, supra, at 624-625,
even though their conduct, if performed in other
than legislative contexts would in itself be unconstitutional or otherw1se contrary to criminal or civil
statutes." Doe v. McMillan, supra, at 312-313.
For us to read the Clause a~ respondents suggest would
create an exception not warranted by the language, purposes or history of the Clause. Respondents make the
familiar argument that the broad protection granted by
the Clause creates a potential for abuse.
That is correct, and in Brewster, supra, we noted that the risk of
such abuse was "the conscious choice of the Framers
buttressed and justified by history." 408 U. S., at 516.
Our consistently broad construction of the Speech or
Debate Clause rests on the belief that it must be so
construed to provide the independence which is its central purpose.
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial
interfer-ence may cause. A legislative inquiry has been
frustrated for nearly five years during which the Members and their aide have beeu obliged to employ counsel
and have been distracted from the purpose of their
inquiry. The Clause exists to prevent precisely this
type of "questioning" and the enlistment of judicial
power to chall-enge the wisdom of Congress' use of its
authority.

v

Wh<'n this case wa!" in the Court of Appeals 1t was
consolidated with three other cases 17 because it was
assumed that "a decision in [this] case might well con17 Progressive Labor Party. et al. v
House Internal Security
f'ommittee . et al. (C. A. No. 71-1609) · National Peace Act!,m
Coalition, et al. v. House Internal Security Committee , et al . (C'. A.
No . 71 ·2034); PPoples Currlitwn for PeMe and Justtce v. Hoti)Je
Jnterual Security Comnuttee, et al (C. A No 71-1717) .
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trol the disposition of [them]." Those cases involve
subpoeuas from the House Internal Security Committee
to banks for the bank records of certain organizations.
As here, the organizations whose bank records were
sought sued alleging that if the subpoenas were honored
their constitutional rights would be violated. The issue
of speech or debate protection for Members and aides
is presented in all the cases. However, the complaints
in the House cases are different from the complaint here,
additional parties are involved, and consequently additional issues may be presented.
Progress in those cases was suspended when they were
in the pleading sta.ge awaiting the outcome of this case.
The issues in them, therefore, have not been joined.
Additionally, it appears that the Session in which the
House subpoenas were issued has expired. Since the
House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuing body,
McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U. S. 135, 181;
Gojack v. United States, 384 U. S. 702, 717 n. 4 (1967),
the question of mootness question may be raised. Moreover it appears that the committee that issued the subpoenas has been abolished by the House, H. Res. 5, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., January 14, 1975. In view of these
problems, and because those cases were not briefed or
argued here, we feel it would b€ unwise to attempt to
decide any issues they might present that are not presented in the instant case. Powell v. McCormack, 395
U. S. 486, 496 JJ. 8, 550 (S'rEWAR'l', J., dissenting).
Judgment in the Senate case is reversed and the case
is remanded to the Court of Appeals for entry of a judgment directing the District Court to dismiss tho complaint. The House cases are remanded with directions
to remand to the District Court for further consideration
consistent with this opinion.

.Reversed and remanded.
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CHAMI!!IERS OF"

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

May 6, 1 975

Re:

73-1923- Eastland v. U. S. Servicemen's Fund

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Henry Putzel suggested to me that because
the House and Senate cases are consolidated under one
number in this Court some language clarifying the
disposition should be added.

I have made some changes

in pp. 19-21, as reflected in the attache a pages.
Regards,

Attachment
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liability for their actions within the 'legislative
sphere,' Gravel v. United States, supra, at 624-625,
even though their conduct, if performed in other
than legislative contexts would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil
statutes." Doe v. McMillan, supra, Ct.t 312-313.
For us to read the Clause as respondents suggest would
create an exception not warranted by the language, purposes or history of the Clause. Respondents make the
familiar argument that the broad protection granted by
the Clause creates a potential for abuse. That is correct, and in Brewster, supra; ·we ·noted that the risk of
such abuse was "the conscious choice Qf the Framers
buttressed and justified by history." 408 U. S., at 516.
Our consistently broad construction of the Speech ~ or
Debate Clause rests on the belief that it must be so
construed to provide the independence which is its central purpose.
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial
interference may cause. A legislative inquiry has been
frustrated for nearly five years during which the Members and their aide have been obliged to devote time to
consultation with their counsel concerning the litigation, and have been distracted from the purpose of their inquiry. The Cluuse was written to prevent -the -need to be confronted by such "questioning" and to forbid
invocation of judicial power to challenge the wisdom of
Congress' use of its investigative authority.

v

the Senate

Whe~ case was in the Court of Appeals it was
consolidated with three other cases 17 because it was
Progressive Labor Party, et al. v. House Internal Security
Committee, et al. (C, A. No. 7l-H109) ; National Peace Action
Coalition, {lt al. v. House Internal Security Committee, et. al. (C. A~
17
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Senate

assumed that "a decision in
case might well con~
the others.....,
trol the disposition of ~-" _Those cases involve
subpoenas from the Holise Internal Security Committee
in · the Senate
to banks for the bank records of certain organizations.
aspect of this case As §i), the organizations whose bank records were
sought sued alleging that if the subpoenas were honored
their constitutional rights would be violated. The issue
of speech or debate protection for Members and aides
is presented in all the cases. However, the complaints
.
in the House cases are different from the complaint ~1.n the Senate
case
additional parties are involved, and consequently additional issues may be presented. the House
Progress in~ cases was suspended when the-y were
in the pleading .stage:awaiting the outcome _of,this case.
the Benate -,_ _
The issues -in them, therefore, ha.ve not been joined.
aspect of~
Additionally, it appears that the Session in which the
House subpoenas were issued has expired. Since the
House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuing body,
McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, 273 U. S. 135, 181;
Gojack v. United States, 384 U. S. 702, 717 n. 4 (1967),
a ""'-+fte question of mootness ~ussti~ay be raised. 1\1oreover it appears that the committee that issuedcihe subthe House aspect - - poenas has been abolished by the House, H. Res. 5, 94th
of this -=.. cas -- Cong., - 1st Sess., January 14, 1975~ - In view- of these ose case - were not briefed or
argued here, we feel it wou
e unwise to attempt to
decide any issues they might present that are not presented in the nstant case. Powell v. McCormack, 395
U. . 86,
n. 8, 559 (STEWART J
with respect tc
Senate aspe
Judgmen m e enat case is reversed and the case
of this
is remanded to the Court of Appea s or entry o a JU gaspect of this
ment directing the District Court to dismiss the com.,
No. 71-2034) ; Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice v.
/'l!ternal Security Committee,. et al. (C. A. No. 71-1717).

Ho-us~
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plaint. The House~ are remanded with directions
to remand to the District Court for further consideration
consistent with this opinion,
Reversed and remanded.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 13, 1975
PERSONAL

Re:

73-1923 - Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund

Dear Lewis:
I agree wholeheartedly with your sentiments and am as
offended as you at the protracted nature of this litigation but felt a
Court opinion could not stress this too much without provoking a
concurrence -- but not like yours. The purposes served by the
Speech or Debate Clause -- especially when they relate to an ongoing
legislative function -- clearly require speedy resolution of actions
like this one. I am not sure, however, whether the respondents
were entirely responsible for the delay. Petitioners, who had just
been "burned" by Powell v. McCormack, it seems to me were in no
great haste. Several times they C!_greed to extensions of time, and
after the original expeditious heari;"gs in both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals everything seemed to settle down and, to my
knowledge, petitioners did not press for expedited consideration of
the matter.
In the opinion I have tried to remedy the delay problem to
some extent. For example, on page 14 the opinion states:
0n this record the pleadings show that the actions
of the Members and the Chief Counsel fall within the
1
sphere of le gitimate legislative activity. 1 11 (Emphasis
added)

11

The underlined phrase is for the benefit of the District Judge confronted
by one of these actions. It is intended to remind District Judges that
they may dismiss on the pleadings alone when a complaint shows on its
face that no relief may be granted against those enjoying Speech or
Debate protection.

- 2 -

It might be wise for me to add something, making it even
clearer that expeditious treatment of cases like this one is essential.
For instance, at the end of the first full paragraph on page 19 I could
add a footnote to this effect:

I

~

~

-

- /

/ Although the Speech or Debate Clause has never been
read so broadly that legislators 11 are absolved from the
duty of filing a motion to dismiss, 11 Powell v. McCormack,
supra, 395 U.S. 486, 505 n. 25; see Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376-77, the purposes which the Clause serves
require that such motions be given the most expeditious
treatment by District Courts because one branch of government is being asked to halt the functions of a coordinate
branch. If there is a dismissal and an appeal, Courts of
Appeals have a duty to see that the litigation is swiftly
resolved. /\ Delay · d
t in this 1' tigation has frustrated
a valid Congressional inquir/
"'

For my part, I would see no need to hand even 11 negative
bouquets to the lawyers for the respondents. I'd give them no brickbats,
but no brownie points!
11

Mr. Justice P owell

May 15, 197S
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May 15,

No. 73-1923 Eastland v. United States
f.

Dear Chief:

"l,

~

;r

>~:(.

Your letter of May 13, suggests to me that the Senate
Committee itself bears part of the responsibility for the
unconscionable delay.
In view of this, I am inclined to abandon my concurrence
if a footnote is added along the lines indicated on page 2
of your letter. I enclose a copy of your proposed footnote, .,"
in which I have added the next to the last sentence. The
footnote will be strengthened if the reader is reminded that
the Senate Subcoumittee has been enjoi~ed for half a . . decade.

k>,t
~"''

\1 ',!;\.

'

'
', Sincerely,
' '·

The Chief Justice
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Although the Speech or Debate Clause has never been
read so broadly that legislators "are absolved from the
duty of filing a motion to dismiss," Powell v. McCormack,
supra, 395
341

u.s.

u.s.

486, SOS n. 25; see Tenney v. Brandhove,

367, 376·77, the purposes which the Clause serves

requires that such motions be given the most expeditious
treatment by District Courts because one branch of government is being asked to half the functions of a coordinate
branch.

If there is a dismissal and an appeal, Courts of

Appeals have a duty to see that the litigation is swiftly
resolved.

Enforcement of the Subcommittee's subpoena has

been restrained since June 1970, nearly five years, While
this litigation dragged through the courts.

This protr acted

delay has frustrated a valid Congressional inquiry.
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CHAMBERS OF

May 21, 1975

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

73-1923 -Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

A purely stylistic change is being made on page 20 so
that the final sentence in the first full paragraph will read:
''In view of these problems, and because the House
aspects of this case were not briefed or argued here,
we conclude it would be unwise to attempt to decide
any issues they might present that are not resolved
in the Senate aspect of this case. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n. 8, 559
(STEWART, J., dissenting). 11
The Headnote

11

lineup 11 prepared by Mr. Putzel reads:

11

B URGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and
REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed
a concurring opinion in which BRENNAN and
STEWART, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. 11
Regards,
)
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm ~*No, 73-1923
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James 0 . Eastland et al.,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
United States Court of
v.
Appeals for the District of
l]nited States Servicemen's
Columbia Circuit,
Fund et al.
[May -, 1975]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
The Court holds today, some five years after this litigation was commenced, that the petitioners are immune
from suit and that the respondents' action-though
properly entertained-should have been dismissed. Thus,
on the official records, the respondents lost their case.
In fact, they won it.
The subpoena of the Subcommittee was issued on
May 28, 1970, commanding production of the requested
records on June 4, 1970. Prior to that date, respondents
brought this action to enJoin implementation of the
subpoena duces tecum. The Court's opinion traces the
tedious history of the resulting litigation, which did not
reach its denouement in the Court of Appeals until January 23, 1974. We granted certiorari on October 11, 1974;
the case was argued on January 22, 1974; and-at long
last-we now direct dismissal of the complaint..
During the intervening five years a legitimate inquiry
of the Senate has been frustrated. Of course, we have
no occasion today to decide the merits of respondents'
First Amendment claim. Nor do we know whether the
activities of respondents, addressed to United States
servicemen during a time of war, were bemg financed or
tlontrolled by "foreign governments.. '' The Senate Sub-·
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committee considered this to be a real possibility. If
it were true, the five-year del~:~-y in resolution of this
litigation, during which time an injunction for.eclosed
legislative inqt.~iry, was intolerable. Presumably, during
this period, resppndents' activities continued unrestrained.
The long delay may have destroyed whatever efficacy the
legislative inquiry might once have had in serving the
public interest.
I am concerned, not with this case in 1975, but rather
with the functioning of the judicial system in a way that
allows a party, whose cause ultimately may be resolved
against him, to delay decision of a case until the mere
passage of time achieves the party's ends. The very
conduct that concerned the Senate Subcommittee was
allowed to continue for years free of legislative investigation. As the Court today notes :
"Private civil actions . .. may be used to delay and
disrupt the legislative function. " Ante, at 11.
I 8mphasize that these observations are not directed
at counsel, who were entitled to take advantage of all
available lawful procedures to further their clients' interests. And, in noting the success of resourceful counsel
in exploiting delay under injunctive protection, I am not
unmindful of the duty of courts to protect the rights
of citizens. As is well stated in MR. JusTICE MARSHALL's
concurring opinipn, the Speech or Debate Clause "does
nat immunize co'ngressional action from judicial review,''
and it may be conceded that the issues presented in this
case merited careful judicial consideration. Indeed this
is apparent from the decisions of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals.
My concern is directed solely to protracted delay in
the judicial process, accompanied by injunctive restraint
of legislative inquiry into what appeared. to be an
emergency situation. Although expedited hearings were

73- 1923-CONCUR (A)
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sometimes held in the course of the proceedings below,
the end result reflects little evidence of expedition and
convincing evidence of successful delaying tactics. In
such a case, it seems to me that the Federal Judiciaryand here I include this Court-must find more effective
means for bringing injunctive litigation to an expeditious
conclusion. Legitimate concern for protecting the asserted rights of citizens must be accompanied by an equal
concern for not allowing the courts to be used as a
means-as they apparently were in this case-of shutting
off legislative inquiry for half a decade.

..
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